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There is a surge in the debate in the U.S. over the methodsof judicial selection and retention, with some rallying formerit-selection plans, others continuing to support judi-
cial elections, and virtually no one proposing lifetime appoint-
ments. The impetus for this surge may be related to three
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White,1 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,2 and
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,3 and to the exploding amount
of campaign funds raised in judicial elections. These factors
seem to have once again brought to the forefront the judicial
election method and consequently revitalized the merit
method, which had been dormant for three decades. Whether
this boost in the debate is tantamount to a new movement, a
continuation of an old movement, a blip on the radar screen, a
wave, or a full-fledged tsunami, remains to be seen. But one
thing is clear:  since the United States’ inception, there have
been periodic movements to change the method of selecting
and retaining judges, and the methods have often been com-
plex and convoluted.
There were essentially three major movements in the U.S.,4
which I will refer to as the “Original Lifetime Appointment
Movement,” the “Jackson Democracy Movement,” and the
“Progressive Reform Movement.” Not unlike the present
debate, political, legal, social, and cultural factors have all
served as the catalysts for these movements. Although there
have been some slight variations, these movements essentially
involve four different selection methods:  lifetime appoint-
ment, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and merit selec-
tion and retention. These movements have been in a constant
state of flux, with many states using constitutional amend-
ments, legislative acts, ballot initiatives, and executive orders
to both move in and out of the methods, and to make modifi-
cations short of complete overhauls. For example, 9 of 16
states that initially only used the appointment method
switched to judicial elections for some level of their judiciary,5
14 states changed from partisan to nonpartisan elections,6 and
15 states have changed from partisan or nonpartisan elections
to some form of the merit method.7 When all is said and done,
over the last 234 years, this activity has resulted in 39 states
deviating substantially from their initial selection method.
Notwithstanding these major changes, there have been far
more slight modifications and failed attempts, than an actual
change in judicial-selection methods. There were approxi-
mately 358 method modifications, including but not limited
to, the creation of commissions, change in term lengths and
periods, change in the mandatory retirement age, and change
in the appointing authority.8 Additionally, there have been
approximately 66 failed attempts to change methods.9
With the exception of some novel intermittent arguments,
the debate over which method is best has remained funda-
mentally the same. While the parties taking up the various
causes have changed over time, including former U.S. Supreme
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Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,10 judges remain at the
center of the debate. Within a historical context, this Paper
will identify and discuss these movements and methods along
with their catalysts. It will also set forth a snapshot of the
methods currently used in each state, as well as state proposals
and measures that could potentially affect these methods. In
light of the recent Supreme Court cases, the Paper will discuss
the impact that these methods may have on a judge’s conduct.
Finally the Paper will specify and restate the arguments both
supporting and criticizing these methods and will review the
various proposals for stopgap measures.  The goal of this Paper
is to identify some of the new challenges and pitfalls for judges
operating within every method of retention and selection given
the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, and to educate
judges about how these methods of selection and retention ebb
and flow over time. Armed with this knowledge, and an under-
standing that change requires respect for the cultural differ-
ences of each method, judges should be able to take a leader-
ship role in the debate. 
I. MOVEMENTS AND METHODS
A. The Original Lifetime Appointment Movement
The first movement was very much influenced by the United
States’ independence from England. In the American colonies,
the “king had absolute control over the appointment and
removal of Judges.”11 Because the founders were concerned
about how judges in England were controlled by the king,12 they
established in the Constitution lifetime appointments for all fed-
eral judges based on the advice and consent of the Senate.13 The
U.S. Constitution was modeled after the Massachusetts State
constitution, which was drafted by John Adams.14 Adams wrote
that judges “should not be dependent upon any man or body of
men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in their
offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during
good behavior . . . .”15 The original states followed suit with life-
time appointments,16 but the method of appointment varied, as
“seven states selected their judges by the legislature and five
states had the governor appoint judges who would then be
approved by a special council
appointed by the legisla-
tures.”17 Another proponent of
this movement was Alexander
Hamilton, who believed that if
a judge engaged in judicial
elections, it would affect judi-
cial independence and hence
the judiciary itself.18 The life-
time appointment method is
still used today for federal
judges, U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, and the state of Rhode
Island.19 Massachusetts and
New Hampshire both have
unlimited judicial terms, but
set a mandatory retirement age
at seventy.20
B. The Jackson Democracy Movement 
The appointment method came under attack during the
presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) when the senti-
ment of the country was that “governmental office holders
should be accountable to the voters and, therefore, elected.”21
This movement ultimately became the largest of the three, as
the decades following Jackson’s presidency saw 21 of 30 states
adopt the popular election method.22 Like many other political
movements, this movement was at first considered radical, a
measure “intended to break judicial power through an infusion
of popular will and majority control.”23 These “radicals”
believed that popular election would remove the selection of
judges from party leaders.24 Scholars have attributed this move
from judicial appointments to judicial elections to several fac-
tors, including “the belief that judges at the local level should
be more responsive to their communities,”25 that electing
judges was considered democratic,26 and that judicial appoint-
ments were being meted out as political patronage.27
This movement began in the early 1800s and continued
through the civil war to the annexation of Alaska in 1959.28
10. Bill Mears, Former Justice O’Connor Leads Push to End Judicial
Elections, CNN.COM, Dec. 15, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/
2009/CRIME/12/15/judicial.elections/; Chris Rizo, O’Connor
Leads Push Against Judicial Elections, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, Dec.
11, 2009, http://legalnewsline.com/ news/224475-oconnor-leads-
push-against-judicial-elections.
11. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and
Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
12. See id. at 4–5 (citing the Declaration of Independence).
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, §1; art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
14. The Massachusetts Judicial Branch, John Adams and the
Massachusetts Constitution, http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/
john-adams-b.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2010).
15. Id.
16. Goldschmidt, supra note 11, at 5.
17. RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL
STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 8 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007).
18. Id.
19. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
20. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. I; N.H. CONST. pt 2, art. 73, 78.
21. Shira J. Goodman & Lynn A. Marks,  A View from the Ground: A
Reform Group’s Perspective on the Ongoing Effort to Achieve Merit
Selection of Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 425, 427 (2007).
22. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform
and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846–1860, 45 THE HISTORIAN
337 (1983).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 9. 
26. Id.
27. TODD EDWARDS, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN SOUTHERN STATES 2 (Feb. 2004), http://www.slcatlanta.org/
Publications/IGA/JudicialSelection.pdf. 
28. LARRY C. BERKSON & RACHEL CAUFIELD, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2004),http://www.ajs.org/
selection/docs/Berkson.pdf. 
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29. Hall, supra note 22.
30. Ohio, Kentucky, and Virginia devoted much attention; Iowa,
Louisiana, and Missouri little attention; and “in only five conven-
tions did the issue of popular election prove sufficiently contro-
versial to require a roll-call vote before adoption.” Id.
31. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of
Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1063
(2010). 
32. Hall, supra note 22.
33. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.; see also BERKSON & CAUFIELD, supra note 28, at 1.
36. “Roscoe Pound was one of the leading figures in twentieth-cen-
tury legal thought. As a scholar, teacher, reformer, and dean of
Harvard Law School, Pound strove to link law and society through
his ‘sociological jurisprudence’ and to improve the administration
of the judicial system.” The Free Dictionary, Pound, Roscoe,
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Roscoe+Pound (last
visited Dec. 9, 2010). Pound was also “part of the founding edito-
rial staff of the first comparative law journal in the U.S., the
Annual Bulletin of the Comparative Law Bureau of the American
Bar Association.” Wikipedia, Roscoe Pound,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roscoe_Pound (last visited Dec. 9,
2010).
37. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 748 (1906).
38. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 10.
39. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 7; CHARLES H. SHELDON & LINDA
S. MAULE, CHOOSING JUSTICE: THE RECRUITMENT OF STATE AND
FEDERAL JUDGES 6 (1997). Nonpartisan elections first appeared in
Cook County, Illinois, in 1873. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17,
at 10.
40. Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections:
Lessons From a Bellwether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357,
1359 (2003); see also RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 10.
41. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 9; see also Stephen P. Croley,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 716 (1995).
42. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee, and Utah. DEBORAH KILEY,
MERIT SELECTION OF CALIFORNIA JUDGES 9 (Mar. 2, 1999),
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/centers/government/ccglp_
pubs_merit_selection_pdf.pdf.
43. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and New York. Id. at 8–9.
44. Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best
Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 163, 169–70 (2007).
45. The Missouri Bar, From the Report by the Commission on Judicial
Independence, History of Merit Selection, http://www.mobar.org/
81a9785d-c049-411d-bdd5-816ffe26a2a6.aspx (last visited Nov.
30, 2010).
The first wave was between
1846 and 1860 when state con-
stitutions were rolled out across
the U.S.29 The debate between
appointment and judicial elec-
tions played out at the constitu-
tional conventions with some
states giving the debate more
attention than others.30 One
scholar attributes this move-
ment to a desire for greater judi-
cial independence: 
In addition to direct limits
on legislative power, most of these conventions adopted
judicial elections. Many delegates stated that their pur-
pose was to strengthen the separation of powers and
empower courts to use judicial review. The reformers
got results: elected judges in the 1850s struck down
many more state laws than their appointed predeces-
sors had in any other decade. These elected judges
played a role in the shift from active state involvement
in economic growth to laissez-faire constitutionalism.31
The reform focused on the appellate and inferior courts,32
with the states of Vermont, Indiana, and Georgia as the first
three states permitting local governments the option to elect
trial court judges.33 This trend was followed by Mississippi in
1832 and New York in 1846.34 By 1850, 7 more states also per-
mitted elections and by the time of the Civil War, 24 states had
an elected judiciary.35
At the turn of the century there was a new round of debates
between the appointment method and the election method
proponents.  Roscoe Pound,36 noted legal scholar, in a well
known speech before the ABA in 1906, stated that “putting
courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politi-
cians in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the tradi-
tional respect for the bench.”37 As a result, there was another
reform of sorts with the creation of nonpartisan elections in an
attempt to remove national partisan interests from state and
local elections and to clean up the patronage and cronyism.38
In 1927, 12 states employed nonpartisan elections,39 and three
other states “had already tried and rejected nonpartisan elec-
tions.”40 By the end of the movement, every state that entered
the Union from 1846 to 1958 used either partisan or nonparti-
san elections to select some or all of their judges.41
C. The Progressive Reform Movement
The merit selection method was proposed for the purpose
of removing judges from the pressures of running for political
office. Merit-selection plans usually select judges through a
nominating commission with gubernatorial or legislative
appointment. After a specified term the judge stands for reten-
tion with no party affiliation or opponent and must receive a
certain vote percentage to be retained. Some states use perfor-
mance evaluations through commissions prior to the retention
election,42 while others use non-elective means of retention,
like reappointment.43 Although the merit selection and reten-
tion method, also known as the “Missouri Plan,” was devel-
oped in 1913 as a compromise that combined the best features
of appointment and election, it did not become a full-fledged
movement until the 1950s and 1960s.44 In 1914, it was the
American Judicature Society that first pushed for retention
elections through its new director Albert M. Kales, who offered
a nonpartisan court plan that featured the basic elements of
nomination, appointment, and elective-tenure.45 Later, in
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47. In 1934, California voters adopted a merit-like retention system
for appellate judges but left the decision regarding superior court
judges to the counties, which still have not adopted the retention
system. American Judicature Society, History of Reform Efforts:
Formal Changes Since Inception, supra note 5. California’s plan is
unique in that the governor makes appointments subject to con-
firmation by a judicial commission, as opposed to the usual merit-
selection plan where a judicial commission provides a list of nom-
inees. See KILEY, supra note 42, at 2–3, 3 n.20. Illinois and
Pennsylvania also use this method. See id. at 3 n.20.
48. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 11.
49. American Judicature Society, History of Reform Efforts:
Unsuccessful Reform Efforts, supra note 9.
50. Id.
51. Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 67, 77–78 (2009).
52. Id. at 78.
53. See American Bar Association, Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection
Methods in the States, http://www.abanet.org/leadership/fact_
sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2010).
54. California, Maine, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia. See
American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:
Selection of Judges, supra note 7.
55. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See id.
56. Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See id.
57. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and West Virginia. See id. Ohio presents somewhat of a
hybrid situation by using partisan primary elections and nonpar-
tisan general elections. Id. Also, several states that use the election
method fill interim vacancies through a merit-selection process.
E.g., American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:
New Mexico, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
methods/selection_of_Judges.cfm?state=NM (last visited Nov. 30,
2010).
58. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See American Judicature
Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:  Selection of Judges, supra
note 7.
59. Only Virginia and South Carolina are selected by the legislature.
Id. 
60. Hon. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (“Judicial reten-
tion elections have been part of the selection and retention
process in many states for over thirty years. Twenty states use
some form of judicial retention election for appellate court judges
and justices, and twelve states use retention elections for at least
some of their trial court judges.”).
61. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
62. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (age 72); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch.
III, art. I (age 70); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73, 78 (age 70); OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 6 (age 70); see also Vermont Legislative Research
Shop, The University of Vermont, Mandatory Retirement Age of
Judges (Apr. 5, 2000), http://www.uvm.edu/~vlrs/doc/manda-
tory_retirement_age_of_judg.htm.
63. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. See Vermont Legislative
Research Shop, supra note 62.
64. California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
1926, Harold Laski first suggested that judicial commissions
do the nominating.46
California adopted a version of this plan in 1934.47 Soon
thereafter Missouri adopted the most familiar version hence
called “the Missouri Plan.”48 It is interesting to note that
Louisiana, in 1921, may have been the first state to consider
the merit-selection method and has since rejected countless
proposals to adopt that method, as “at least one proposed con-
stitutional amendment calling for merit selection has been
introduced in all but one legislative session” since 1978.49
Similarly, Texas has rejected proposals to adopt the merit selec-
tion method numerous times, with ten rejections.50 Several fac-
tors, however, largely unrelated to judicial performance, con-
verged to halt the spread of the merit-selection method. These
factors included fractious constitutional conventions, a decline
in public confidence in both public and private institutions,
disenchantment with the merit method, and opposition to
change.51 By the mid-1980s, “these factors essentially halted
the trend to merit selection.”52
II. THE SNAPSHOT
A. Current State Judicial-Selection Methods
All four of the judicial-selection methods just discussed are
currently in use in various states. Sometimes states will even
use some combination of several methods.53 As a result,
appeals court judges, trial court judges, and county or munic-
ipal judges, may be selected or
retained using different meth-
ods within the same state.
Generally, 5 states use guberna-
torial or legislative merit
appointments without commis-
sions,54 14 states and the
District of Columbia use merit
selection through nominating
commissions,55 9 states use
merit selection combined with
other methods,56 8 states use a
partisan election system,57 and
14 states use a nonpartisan
election system.58 In the 19
states that either use merit
selection or appointments,
judges are usually appointed by either the governor or the leg-
islature,59 and then face either a retention election,60 or a reap-
pointment process by lawmakers.
While there is no mandatory retirement age for either U.S.
Supreme Court Justices or federal judges, with the exception of
one lifetime appointment state, Rhode Island,61 the remaining
states have a variety of mandatory retirement ages ranging from
70–75 years,62 or mandatory retirement with conditional provi-
sions,63 or no mandatory retirement age at all.64 In 1991, two
Missouri state court judges challenged the mandatory retire-
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66. Id. at 467, 473.
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69. White, 536 U.S. at 768.
70. Id. at 768–69.
71. Id. at 768.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 788.
74. See O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2008) (court
abstained from reaching the merits); Family Trust Found. of Ky.,
Inc. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n, 388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004)
(successful); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct,
351 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2003) (court abstained from reaching the
merits); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002) (suc-
cessful); Smith v. Phillips, No. CIV.A.A-02CV111JRN, 2002 WL
1870038 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2002) (successful); In re Kinsey, 842
So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003) (unsuccessful); In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338
(Me. 2003) (unsuccessful); In re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y.
2003) (unsuccessful); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003)
(unsuccessful).
75. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1039–41
(D.N.D. 2005).
76. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (1990).
77. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. The Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D.
Fla. 1990) (explaining that “a person does not surrender his con-
stitutional right to freedom of speech when he becomes a candi-
date for judicial office”); see also JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 11-14 to 11-15 (4th ed. 2007).
78. Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp.
309, 314 (W.D. Ky. 1991); see also ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at
11-17. 
79. See, e.g., In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
80. See, e.g., Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2001).
81. See, e.g., In re Bybee, 716 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. 1999); In re Donohoe,
580 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1978).
ment provision in Missouri’s
Constitution, resulting in the
U.S. Supreme Court case
Gregory v. Ashcroft.65 The Court,
with Justice O’Connor writing
for the majority, held that (1)
appointed Missouri state judges
constitute appointees “on a poli-
cymaking level,” and were thus
excluded from protection under
the Federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and (2) the
Missouri Constitution’s manda-
tory retirement provision did not
violate the Equal Protection
Clause.66
B. The Catalysts for the Current Debate 
The current momentum for the debate may be attributed to
several factors. First, there has been a profusion of cases
brought by judges across the country regarding judicial cam-
paign activity, culminating in two U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions:  Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co.67 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
recently decided Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,68 which may impact judicial campaign contribu-
tions. Lastly, the current debate may also be attributed to the
rising rate of judicial campaign contributions and polls indi-
cating public dissatisfaction with the judiciary as a whole. 
1. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
a. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
The question presented in White was whether the First
Amendment permitted the Minnesota Supreme Court to pro-
hibit candidates for judicial election “from announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues.”69 The judge in
question, in the course of his nonpartisan campaign, “distrib-
uted literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion.”70
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i),
featured an “announce clause,” restricting a candidate for judi-
cial office from announcing his or her views on disputed legal
issues.71 This Minnesota code provision was based on Canon
7(B) of the 1972 American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code
of Judicial Conduct.72 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the provision infringed on a judge’s right to free speech.73 As a
result of the White decision, elected judges, unlike appointed
and merit-selected judges, have brought a myriad of First
Amendment free speech challenges related to campaign activ-
ity, some finding success, while others did not.74 The White
decision also had implications outside the context of announce
clauses. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of
North Dakota struck down a clause restricting judges from
making pledges or promises regarding certain legal issues, rely-
ing on White.75
But even in the years prior to White, judges were challenging
disciplinary actions and bringing lawsuits related to judicial
campaign activity with varying outcomes. These judges argued
First Amendment free speech violations mostly related to judi-
cial campaigns under the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, preventing a judicial candidate from making
“pledges, promises, or commitments” with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues likely to come before the court.76 The
actions ranged from a successful challenge to Florida’s Canon
7B(1)(c), which prohibited discussion of “disputed legal or
political issues,”77 to an unsuccessful challenge to Kentucky’s
Canon 7B(1)(c), where the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
“there is a compelling state interest in so limiting a judicial can-
didate’s speech, because the making of campaign commitments
on issues likely to come before the Court tends to undermine
the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system.”78
These two decisions dealt with similar issues but reached oppo-
site results. Several First Amendment challenges also arose out-
side of the context of commenting on legal issues likely to come
before the court. These challenges covered issues such as:  state-
ments relating to conduct in office,79 candidate question-
naires,80 and the accuracy of campaign statements.81 These
types of challenges also had varying outcomes. In the federal
arena, courts have tended to strike down restrictions on both
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campaign statements and a judge’s ability to respond to ques-
tionnaires, relying on First Amendment grounds.82
The repercussions from the White decision took several
forms:  states repealed their announce clauses,83 issued advi-
sory opinions,84 or declared that White did not affect their
codes;85 judicial ethics commissions dismissed proceedings
against judges;86 and judges commenced constitutional chal-
lenges.87 As evidenced by the extensive commentary regarding
White,88 the Supreme Court’s decision has done little to settle
what is and what is not protected judicial campaign speech.
Ethics advisory committees and disciplinary bodies continue
to enforce restrictions on judicial speech as long as the restric-
tions are narrowly tailored and differ from the restrictions
struck down in White.89 The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (“2007 Code”) takes a similar approach.90 As a result
of White, the ABA added five comments to Rule 4.1 in the 2007
Code (paragraphs 11 through 15) that discuss the distinctions
between various “announce clauses.”91 Although the 2007
Code offers a better definition of acceptable campaign speech,
not all of the states have adopted the Code in toto.92 While the
White decision addressed a candidate’s political speech during
his or her own judicial campaign, it did not address free speech
regarding a judge’s personal involvement in political activities
outside of their own judicial campaign. Thus, it is quite possi-
ble that the White decision will spark a flurry of new cases.93
However, according to some scholars, the fear that the White
decision would result in “rancorous free-for-alls” has not been
realized.94
b. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
Another important U.S. Supreme Court case involving free
speech is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.95
While the issue in White
related to judges’ freedom of
speech, the issue in Citizens
United related to the free
speech of a campaign sup-
porter in a presidential elec-
tion. In January 2008, appel-
lant Citizens United, a non-
profit corporation, released a
documentary critical of then-
Senator Hillary Clinton, a can-
didate for her party’s presiden-
tial nomination.96 Citizens United was poised to pay a cable
television company to carry the documentary through video-
on-demand during the 30 days prior to primary elections.97
There was a concern, however, that such action would violate
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which prohibits
corporations from spending general treasury funds on “elec-
tioneering communications”—defined as “‘any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly iden-
tified candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days
of a primary or 60 days of a general election.”98 Thus, Citizens
United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Federal Election Commission.99
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a controversial 5 to 4 decision,
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, holding that
the “Government may regulate corporate political speech
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not
suppress that speech altogether.”100 The Court struck down the
portion of the BCRA that prohibited all corporations, both for-
profit and not-for-profit, and unions from broadcasting elec-
tioneering communications, and thus also overruled a portion
Citizens United
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101. Id. at 913.
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105. Clear The Bench Colorado, http://www.clearthebenchcol-
orado.org/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2010). This group’s efforts failed,
as all three justices were retained. Post of Matt Masich to Law
Week Colorado, http://www.lawweekonline.com/2010/11/colo-
supreme-court-justices-retained/ (Nov. 3, 2010).
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Marriage, THE MINNESOTA INDEPENDENT, Nov. 3, 2010, available at
http://minnesotaindependent.com/73736/iowa-ousts-three-
supreme-court-justices-sets-stage-for-push-to-overturn-gay-
marriage.
110. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256–57,
2265 (2009).
111. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-58 to 11-59.
112. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
113. Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, Citizens United Called
Grave Threat For America’s Courts (Jan. 22, 2010)
http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/citi-
zens_united_called_grave_threat_for_americas_courts?show=ne
ws&newsID=6669.
of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, which upheld the
same provision.101 This holding
was based in part on the fact that
the BCRA’s prohibition on elec-
tioneering communications was
an “outright ban on speech,
backed by criminal sanctions.”102
It is comprehensible that
Citizens United may impact judi-
cial campaigns in election states
because corporate expenditures
are now unlimited. Although some scholars see Citizens United
as “another tool for condemning” judicial elections,103 this case
may also impact retention elections in merit-selection states. A
judge in an election state is cognizant of the need to raise funds
and run a campaign. In a retention election, however, the judge
may be totally unaware of the need to raise funds or campaign
until it is too late. Campaigning is not at the core of the merit
method as it is with the judicial-election method; in fact, that is
the principal distinguishing factor between the two. Typically, a
judge in a merit-selection state cannot even lodge a retention
campaign unless there is “active opposition.”104 One need not
even fashion a hypothetical scenario to make the point.
Currently in Colorado there is a somewhat active group of indi-
viduals called “Clear the Bench,” composed of a few state law-
makers and others who sought to vote out three Colorado
Supreme Court Justices based upon some of their more contro-
versial decisions.105 Unlike the organized 1996 campaigns of
Supreme Court Justice Lanphier and the group opposing him—
the first Supreme Court Justice in Nebraska history not to be
retained by the voters106—even at the latest stages of the elec-
tion cycle, other than some articles and editorials, there were no
known monetary expenditures by Clear the Bench in Colorado.
In a recent ruling, however, a state court required the group to
register as a political committee which means that they can only
accept donations under $525.00 per donor.107 None of the three
Colorado Supreme Court Justices up for retention engaged in
any campaign efforts. There was also a recent, successful effort
in Larimer County, Colorado to oust two state court judges for
their actions as former prosecutors, where the judges received
an advisory opinion allowing them to publicly respond to the
opposition.108 The most recent attempt to oust merit-selected
judges occurred in Iowa, where the National Organization for
Marriage spent $230,000 on television ads criticizing three state
supreme court justices for their ruling in a same sex marriage
case.109 Consider what would happen if a group seeking to oust
a merit-selected judge or justice received a large corporate
donation and waited until immediately prior to the retention
vote to usher in a tremendous statewide campaign? The judge
or justice will be ill-prepared, unfunded, and without an advi-
sory opinion permitting response; in other words, they will be
“sitting ducks.” In this sense, Citizens United may have an affect
on retention elections in merit-selection states.
c. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
While Citizens United may indirectly impact all judicial
campaigns, Caperton will have a more direct effect. In
Caperton, the United States Supreme Court held that a justice’s
failure to recuse himself when a campaign contributor
appeared in his court violated the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment.110 Prior to this case, contributions by per-
sons or groups who represented a particular point of view, such
as opposition to abortion or to capital punishment, were not
precluded from making donations to judicial campaigns, but
there was always a concern that significant public attention
would lead to perceptions of favoritism.111 Caperton held that
such perceived favoritism might be so great as to require
mandatory judicial recusal based on constitutional con-
cerns.112 Although the circumstances in Caperton involved
judicial campaign contributions, this case has implications for
any type of perceived judicial favoritism.
In December 2009, “Michigan’s Supreme Court issued new
rules making it harder for justices to hear cases involving
major campaign supporters,”113 and “Wisconsin became the
third state to provide public financing for appellate court races,
88 Court Review - Volume 46 
While Citizens
United may 
indirectly impact
all judicial 
campaigns,
Caperton will
have a more
direct effect.
114. Id.
115. Patrick Marley, Proposed Order on Judicial Donations Remains up
for Debate, JOURNAL SENTINEL (Milwaukee), Jan. 18, 2010, avail-
able at http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/
82010232.html.
116. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
2168, 2179 (2006) (asserting that all the Justices in White
assumed that “[c]andidates for judicial office will find them-
selves under an obligation of some sort to speak out on contro-
versial issues once they are liberated to do so, while nominees
for judicial office will not”). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
“Announcement” By Federal Judicial Nominees, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1281, 1287 (2004) (asserting that the decision in White is
not limited to elected judges, and that it affords appointed judges
the same right to engage in political speech).
117. In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) (Mo. 2002) (en
banc).
118. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 1; see also DEBORAH
GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 vii (June 2005), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsReport200
4_83BBFBD7C43A3.pdf. 
119. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 1.
120. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 118, at 14–15.
121. Adam Skaggs, Judging For Dollars, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 3,
2010, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/judging-
dollars.
122. E.g., Amanda Terkel, Target Donates $150K To Group Supporting
Candidate Who Wants To Cut Waiters’ Minimum Wage, THINK
PROGRESS, July 27, 2010,
http://thinkprogress.org/2010/07/27/target-emmer-donate/.
123. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-38.
124. Id. at 11-40.
125. Id. 
so that judicial candidates would not have to seek money from
those appearing before them in court.”114 In contrast, the next
month, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was seeking to finalize a
proposed order that said judicial campaign contributions do
not require judges to step aside from hearing cases involving a
supporter.115
d. Collective Implications of White, Citizens United and
Caperton
When one begins to apply these three cases collectively to a
judicial campaign and election, things become convoluted.
Consider a scenario where a judge receives a campaign contri-
bution from an oil and gas corporation or an anti-abortion
nonprofit corporation by virtue of a cable advertisement for
the judge or against his opponent. Under Citizens United, in
those states without contribution limits, the corporation may
now expend an unlimited amount of advertising funds on
behalf of a judge. Additionally, that judge, under his exercise of
free speech rights as enunciated in White, may now openly
state his opposition to the use of alternative energy or abortion.
But one obstacle standing in the way of perceived or real judi-
cial partiality is Caperton. Under these circumstances a
Caperton argument would most likely result in the judge’s
recusal from the case. But what happens under the same sce-
nario when a different corporation with the exact same views
as the contributing corporation comes before the judge? While
the judge may recuse on the basis of a perceived partiality,
there is no mandate for him to do so under Caperton. There is
now a concern over the influence of politics in judicial elec-
tions as a result of of White, which permits judicial candidates
to discuss their positions on various legal issues while cam-
paigning, including issues that may come before them for deci-
sion.116 In response to White, the Missouri Supreme Court
repealed their announce clause, stating that “[r]ecusal, or
other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of any
judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge has
announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate
under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”117
2. INCREASED EXPENDITURES
IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Even before Citizens United,
private contributions to judicial
campaigns were beginning to
skyrocket and were playing a
major role in the success or
defeat of a judge running for a
seat on the bench:  “In the 2000,
2002 and 2004 election cycles,
candidates raised $123 million
compared with only $73.5 mil-
lion in the preceding three
cycles.”118 In a particularly
astounding example, a group in
West Virginia “raised at least $3.6
million to successfully beat an
incumbent.”119 Similarly, the
2004 contest between Lloyd
Karmeier and Gordon Maag, two
Illinois Supreme Court candi-
dates, raised almost $9.4 million, nearly double the previous
national record.120 That amount topped the money raised in 18
of 34 U.S. Senate races decided that year.121 One could foresee
these situations giving rise to backlash against a corporation for
funding a judicial candidate, not unlike those typical to political
campaigns. For example, in Minnesota, Target Corporation’s
donation to a group that supported the gubernatorial candidate
Tom Emmer has received harsh press from a variety of groups.122
Fortunately, there are some small restrictions in the judicial
campaign arena under both the 1990 and 2007 ABA Codes.
Judicial candidates may promote their campaigns through
advertisements under Canon 5C(1)(b)(ii) of the 1990 Code
and Rule 4.2(B)(2) of the 2007 Code, with some restrictions
related to the content.123 A judge engaged in judicial campaigns
may also accept contributions. The financing of a judicial cam-
paign is governed by Canon 5C(2) of the 1990 Code, which
requires a candidate to create campaign committees, and Rule
4.1(A)(8) of the 2007 Code, which does not.124 Who may be on
those committees and who may chair those committees varies
from state to state.125 There are also constraints on the solicita-
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tion of funds by those judicial
campaign committees, and these
too vary from state to state.126
Further, each state permits solici-
tation within various time lim-
its,127 as the 2007 Code also
leaves the solicitation time limits
to each state.128 The effectiveness
of these model codes, however, is
limited by the fact that not all of
the states have adopted all of the
code provisions.
3. PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION WITH THE JUDICIARY
Polling data that includes voters, business leaders, and
judges themselves demonstrates the concern over the potential
impact on the courts from special interest money. For example,
78% are very or somewhat concerned that judicial candidates
must, among other things, raise more money and 79% of busi-
ness leaders believe that contributions made to judicial cam-
paigns have some influence on judges’ decisions.129 Further,
more than 90% of the individuals polled believe that “judges
should not hear cases involving individuals or groups that con-
tributed to their campaign.”130 All of the public dissatisfaction
with the judiciary, however, is not based solely on the conduct
of judges in judicial elections. For example, even in merit-
selection states, where there are no campaigns or campaign
contributions, “the national trends in political trust of the judi-
ciary in the last two decades are found to be reflected in the
trends in the reported declines in the affirmative retention
vote.”131 The American Judges Association White Paper enti-
tled Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public
Dissatisfaction stated that “Americans are highly sensitive to
the processes of procedural fairness. It is no surprise, then, that
the perception of unfair or unequal treatment ‘is the single
most important source of popular dissatisfaction with the
American legal system.’’’132
III. THE DEBATE
As one scholar noted, “it is fairly certain that no single sub-
ject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-
related publications over the last 50 years as the subject of
judicial selection.”133 There has been a continuum of associa-
tions, organizations, and individuals involved in the debate, all
supporting various selection methods. In the past, these enti-
ties have included the League of Women Voters, Democracy
South, the Institute on Money in State Politics, and the
American Judicature Society—as the initiator of the merit
method and its ardent supporter. Today, the American
Judicature Society is still active in the debate, and is joined by
the Brennan Center, the ABA, the Justice at Stake Campaign, a
few state supreme court justices from around the country,134
and the Institute for Advancement of the American Legal
System, lead by Justice O’Connor. Although the Conference of
Chief Justices recognized the “hazards” of partisan judicial
elections,135 it ultimately labeled partisan elections a “reason-
able, constitutionally defensible method.”136 The National
Center for State Courts has remained neutral on the matter.137
Various academics and commentators are divided, with some
supporting judicial elections, allowing each constituent the
opportunity to exercise his or her democratic vote, while oth-
ers back a merit selection process, contending it insulates
judges from politics.
The basis for three of the major movements and methods
has lived on as part of the debate, as the proponents of judicial
elections continue to argue that elections hold judges account-
able to the public. The arguments, in their most basic terms,
break down to “judicial accountability” through the election
process, and “judicial independence” via merit-based selec-
tion.138 Electing judges is seen as consistent with our democ-
ratic ideals; allowing voters to decide maintains the indepen-
dence of the judicial branch by taking appointment influence
away from the other two branches.139 If the voters feel a par-
ticular judge is not doing his or her job properly, they can vote
the judge out at the next election or, in some states, request a
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Christie, the first Republican elected New Jersey governor since
1997, said he believes the panel has a history of “legislating from
the bench,” but declined to reference any specific decisions from
the justice who was not reappointed. Id. The governor said he
made the move to begin reshaping the seven-member court,
which was made up of four Democrats, two Republicans and an
Independent. Id.
recall election.140 Supporters of the election system maintain
that election allows for less partisanship than appointment.141
Selecting judges through elections, however, requires candi-
dates to campaign, ultimately involving speeches, debates, and
raising campaign funds, making judicial elections more like
legislative elections.142 Opponents of judicial elections note
that large donations from certain special interest groups or
even other lawyers can lower public confidence in the judi-
ciary and potentially improperly influence a judge’s impartial-
ity in his or her decisions.143 Elections are also viewed as part
of a political process, while judges are expected to be insulated
from politics. The basic idea behind elections—government by
the people—conflicts with the notion that judges are not sup-
posed to be influenced by the public’s will.144
On the other hand, supporters of merit-selection systems
emphasize how this model creates judicial independence.145
Merit-based appointments separate the judicial branch from
politics and other possible outside influences.146 Backers of
merit-based selection assert that the process ensures that the
most qualified and competent candidates are selected.147
Generally, candidates are evaluated by lawyers, rather than the
public, who are arguably better suited to assess a candidate’s
relevant qualifications.148 Many states that use merit selection
also have evaluation systems or retention elections in place to
assure accountability.149 Additionally, merit-selection propo-
nents purport that this mode of selection increases the num-
ber of minorities serving as judges and resolves the problem
of voter apathy.150 But Chris Bonneau, a noted expert in judi-
cial selection, suggests that voters are not apathetic, that they
do indeed turn out for compet-
itive judicial elections and that
they are able to distinguish
between candidates with prior
judicial experience and those
without prior judicial experi-
ence.151
Supporters of the merit
method also argue that judges
who must campaign will be
influenced by a campaign con-
tributor’s ideology. Some schol-
ars, however, believe that an
apolitical selection process is fiction and that judges are not
mere technocrats.152 In other words, they believe that the
merit process is still politicized.153 They maintain that the
merit method may lead to appointments that further the inter-
ests of the elected official’s political party since a politically
elected figure, whether it is the governor or legislator, ulti-
mately selects the judicial candidate.154 For example, New
Jersey’s Republican Governor Chris Christie recently decided
not to reappoint a Democrat to New Jersey’s highest court.155
Additionally, merit selection arguably erodes judicial account-
ability, making the appointed judges only answerable to fellow
bar members or other community or political persons who
helped to select them. Some even argue that most nominating
commissions are attorney “centric,” which further removes
the public from the judicial selection process. Various other
challenges have been raised against the merit selection sys-
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453, 457 (S.C. 2010). 
157. Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 2010). The
Plaintiffs have petitioned the Ninth Circuit for rehearing en
banc. Brennan Center for Justice, Kirk v. Carpeneti,
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/kirk_v_carpenet
i/ (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
158. Brennan Center for Justice, Kirk v. Carpeneti, supra note 157.
159. See DEBOW ET AL., supra note 148; Maute, supra note 147, at
1209–10.
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American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:
Retention Evaluation Programs, http://www.judicial
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161. Mears, supra note 10; Rizo, supra note 10.
162. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 41, at 747 (stating that lifetime
tenure can help avoid the “the biased administration of day-to-
day justice. Judges who never have to seek or preserve electoral
support have no incentive to please supporters”).
163. Jonathan L. Entin, Judicial Selection and Political Culture, 30 CAP.
U. L. REV. 523, 539–40, (2002).
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165. See, e.g., Charles Roos, Editorial, Voter Distrust of Judges Goes
Well Beyond Hufnagel, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov. 16, 1996, at 68A.
166. Bartels, supra note 94.
tem; for example, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina
recently denied a judge’s chal-
lenge to South Carolina’s merit-
selection system based on a sep-
aration-of-powers argument.156
In another example, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed a challenge to Alaska’s
merit-selection system on the
basis that it violates the Equal
Protection Clause.157 In that
case, the plaintiffs argued that because 3 of the 7 members of
Alaska’s nominating commission “are appointed by the Alaska
bar association’s Board of Governors, and because Alaska
lawyers have a greater voice in the selection of the Board of
Governors than non-lawyers, the state’s non-lawyers are
impermissibly denied an ‘equal voice’ in the selection of state
court judges.’“158
Further, special interest groups can still play a role in merit-
based selection if they have influence over members of the
nominating commission or the judicial performance commis-
sions who are typically political appointees.159 These commis-
sions change with party politics and may influence whether a
retention recommendation is given to a judge. Ten states use
judicial performance commissions, which survey individuals
who have interacted with the judge to evaluate the judge’s legal
ability, integrity, communication skills, temperament, and
administrative capacity.160 One could imagine, however, scenar-
ios where the data used in those commission surveys becomes
misleading or flawed. Hypothetically, a judge may receive a “do
not retain” recommendation from a commission with only five
negative responses to a survey, where there were only ten total
responses from a specific category of respondents, i.e. law
enforcement. The commission may then state that 50% of that
respondent category—law enforcement in this example—rec-
ommends that the judge not be retained. As a result, a mere five
individuals may have the power to affect a judge’s career. This
is particularly troublesome in those states that have a manda-
tory threshold percentage to actually receive a “retain” recom-
mendation from a commission. Additionally, there may be a
disproportionate amount of responses in a given category that
may also affect the judge’s ratings. For example, if a judge is
perceived to be defense oriented and he or she receives 100
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responses from the general category of attorneys, only 20 of
whom are defense attorneys and 80 of whom are prosecutors,
the judge is unfairly penalized because the responses were not
weighted.
While the debate over merit selection versus election
ensues; no one seems to be proposing lifetime appointments as
a method of judicial selection. But given the fact that the fed-
eral government and three states appoint judges without term
limits, and the fact that judicial elections garner much disfavor
due to judicial campaign activity,161 the appointment method is
now certainly worthy of entering the debate. This approach
would be consistent with how judges were first selected in the
U.S. and it would eliminate some of the concerns raised by the
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in White, Caperton,
and Citizens United, in that it would extricate judges from all
judicial campaign activity. The proponents of lifetime appoint-
ments argue that when judges are insulated from political
activity, they become more impartial.162 Opponents would
argue that, similar to merit-based systems, unlimited tenure
would diminish the democratic process by taking away the
public’s ability to vote in judicial elections. The opponents
would also argue that, even worse than the merit-selection and
retention system, unlimited tenure denies the public the
chance to evaluate judges whatsoever—there would be no
electoral mechanism for the removal of a judge, and thus
judges would become less accountable to the public. Despite
these concerns, every judge at every level in every state is
always subject to a removal mechanism for cause.
The scholars, political scientists, experts in judicial selec-
tion, and professors in academia, take differing views on the
subject. Some scholars believe that elective and appointive sys-
tems do not differ much in their actual operation.163 This is
due in part to the fact that “most incumbent judges are rarely
opposed for reelection, and the overwhelming majority of
judges who face the voters retain their seats.”164 But retention
vote percentages have been diminishing over time.165 Bonneau
and Melinda Gann Hall, who are experts in the areas of judi-
cial selection and politics, have empirically assessed and
attempted to debunk many of the “reformers” arguments in
their newly released book entitled In Defense of Judicial
Elections.166 These scholars believe that those promoting the
merit method use only normative information in their argu-
ments; contrastingly, these scholars use empirical information
in an attempt “to elevate the discussion of judicial selection
167. Id.
168. Id.
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Ballotpedia, Nevada Judicial Appointment Amendment,
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Judicial_Appointment_Amendment,_Question_1_(2010) (last
visited Dec. 8, 2010).
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reform bills in 2010, “the first of the two bills is a public financ-
ing pilot project for the two state Supreme Court seats up for
grabs in the 2012 election. The second bill would create a judi-
cial advisory committee to aid the governor in the selection of
judges for circuit court vacancies.” Chris Dickerson, Manchin
Has Two Judicial Reform Bills, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, January 14,
2010, http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/224992-manchin-
has-two-judicial-reform-bills.
174. “Recent reform efforts have failed to get through the Legislature
so Texans can vote on changing the system. A state constitu-
tional amendment would be needed to enact this reform.
Lawmakers should try again next year. Competent and impartial
justice with minimal political interference is a goal worth pursu-
ing.” B. Davidson, Bexar Partisan Sweep Highlights Need for
Judicial Reform, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/bexar_partisan_sweep_
highlights_need_for_judicial_reform_106645368.html?c=y&pa
ge=2#storytop. No statewide ballot measures on this topic made
it to the ballot. Eagle Forum, Election Guide–Texas, http://eagle-
forum.www.capwiz.com/election/guide/tx (last visted Dec. 8,
2010).
175. The Missouri Bar, History of Merit Selection, supra note 45.
176. Ballotpedia, Missouri Judicial Selection Amendment, http://bal-
lotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Missouri_Judicial_Selection_Amen
dment_(2010) (last visited Dec. 8, 2010).
177. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4.
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182. Ann Swidler, Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies, 51 AM.
SOC. REV. 273, 273 (1986).
183. Harvard International Office, Adjusting to a New Culture and
Country, http://www.hio.harvard.edu/settlinginatharvard/orien-
tation/adjustingtoanewculture/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2010). 
184. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(3d ed. 1996).
beyond the hyperbolic rhetoric.”167 They conclude that elec-
tions are the best way to select judges, though they acknowl-
edge this method is not without its problems.168
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR METHOD CHANGES AND
WHY THEY FAIL
Kansas,169 Ohio,170 Minnesota,171 Nevada,172 West
Virginia,173 and Texas,174 have either tendered a proposal or are
considering changing from the election system to the merit
selection and retention system, or vice versa. Ironically, in
Missouri, a state whose name is synonymous with merit selec-
tion—i.e. “the Missouri Plan”175—there was an unsuccessful
proposal to move from the traditional merit selection plan,
through a nominating commission, to selection directly by the
governor subject to confirmation by the senate.176
Some scholars, coined the “standard account” scholars,
believe that the selection methods are chosen based upon soci-
ety’s responses to popular ideas at different historical periods.177
But other scholars believe that methods are changed and mod-
ified based upon the bargaining processes among relevant polit-
ical actors, which include their preferences at the moment and
their future political circumstances.178 For example, which
method prevails is directly related to whether the political
actors believe that they will remain in power and have an
obliged judiciary.179 These scholars would also argue that the
Jackson Democracy Movement was due to the nation’s lawyers
seeking prestige as potential judges and not because of societal
sentiment.180 These scholars
have supported their position
with empirical data.181
The reason proposals for
changes in these methods fail or
succeed is influenced by cultural
and socio-political considera-
tions. According to sociologist
Ann Swidler, culture is like a
“tool kit” that people may use “to
solve different kinds of prob-
lems.”182 A change in method
could create “culture shock,”
which “grows out of the difficulties in assimilating the new cul-
ture, causing difficulty in knowing what is appropriate and what
is not.”183 Consider as an example if the judges, lawyers, and the
electorate in Colorado, a merit-selection state, or Louisiana, an
election state, were suddenly required to switch to the other
method. This would be tantamount to telling those judges and
others that they now have to speak Chinese without having
taken a course in the language. These judges are indoctrinated
and inculcated into their state’s existing selection method.
Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued
“that people are unlikely to jettison an unworkable paradigm,
despite many indications that the paradigm is not functioning
properly, until a better paradigm can be presented.”184 If a better
paradigm is presented and a change is accepted, the next step
Court Review - Volume 46 93
the reason 
proposals for
changes in these
methods fail or
succeed is 
influenced by 
cultural and
socio-political
considerations.
185. For an example of a change management model, see Change
Management Learning Center, ADKAR Change Management
Model Overview, http://www.change-management.com/tutorial-
adkar-overview.htm (last visited Dec. 14, 2010).
186. Ian Urbina, 24 States’ Laws Open to Attack After Campaign
Finance Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/us/politics/23states.html?_
r=1.
187. American Judicature Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections:
Campaign Financing, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_
selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_financing.cfm?sta
te= (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
188. DENISE ROTH BARBER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE
POLITICS, CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (Mar.
2, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Report
View.phtml?r=414.
189. National Center for State Courts, Judicial Selection and
Retention FAQs, http://www.ncsc.org/topics/judicial-
officers/judicial-selection-and-retention/faq.aspx (click on the
hyperlink entitled “Where can I find information about cam-
paign-finance law for elected state judicial officials?”) (last vis-
ited Dec. 8, 2010).
190. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
191. Neal Peirce, Big Money, Attack Ads Infect Judicial Elections,
CITIWIRE.NET, Aug. 26, 2010, http://citiwire.net/post/2231/.
192. American Judicature Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections:
Campaign Financing, supra note 187.
193. Office of the New Mexico Secretary of State, Voter Action Act,
http://www.sos.state.nm.us/temp.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2010);
see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-2, 3 (making public funding
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http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/ji3.pdf.
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http: / /www.abanet .org/ judind/pdf /commiss ionreport
4-03.pdf. 
198. Posting of Zachary Proulx to the Brennan Center for Justice blog,
Also a Winner: Public Funding, http://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/archives/also_a_winner_public_funding/ (Nov. 10, 2008).
would be to implement a
change management compo-
nent.185
V. INTERIM REMEDIES
A. Campaign Finance and
Public Finance Laws
Prior to Citizens United, 24
states had laws banning or
severely limiting corporate
electioneering,186 and 16 states
either limited or completely
banned corporate contribu-
tions to candidates.187 The
Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United will effect the
removal of these corporate
expenditure limits or bans. The
National Institute on Money in State Politics noted the effect of
the Court’s decision:
The “Citizens United v FEC” ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court has no effect on campaign limits in
place at the state and federal levels but may effectively
overturn laws in 24 states that ban or restrict corpora-
tions from funding [advocacy] for or against state can-
didates. In the 22 states that prohibit corporations from
giving to candidates, individuals contributed about half
of the money raised by candidates and non-individuals
provided less than one-fourth. The reverse is true in the
28 states that allow corporate giving.188
Elected judges are generally subject to the same state cam-
paign finance laws as other state officials unless there are stated
exceptions for the judiciary, but even then the laws vary with
the level and jurisdiction of the court.189 There are seven states
that specifically limit judicial campaign contributions.190 One
way to avoid the potential impact of Citizens United on judicial
campaigns is to make a distinction between general elections,
which was the concern in Citizens United, and judicial elec-
tions. The United States Supreme Court opinions are typically
narrowly tailored and only apply to the facts of the case before
it. Given this potential distinction, state prohibitions on cor-
porate contributions to judicial elections might be upheld. 
If such a distinction is not recognized, a logical choice for
states might be to replace prohibitions and limitations on cor-
porate spending with public financing for judicial campaigns.
Some states seem to be moving in this direction,191 and a few
have already provided for public financing of judicial elections.
In 2002, North Carolina passed the Judicial Campaign Reform
Act, which provides for full public funding for state appellate
and supreme court elections.192 Similarly, in 2007, New
Mexico amended their Voter Action Act to allow judicial can-
didates in contested primary and general elections for appel-
late and supreme court seats to opt for public financing.193 In
2009, “Wisconsin passed a bill to curb the influence of special-
interest spending in state Supreme Court elections by support-
ing qualifying candidates with taxpayer funding.”194 In West
Virginia the legislature began a pilot program for public financ-
ing for judicial vacancies.195 The Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU School of Law,196 the ABA, and the Committee for
Economic Development all support full public financing of
judicial elections as a way to prevent the perceived or real par-
tiality that may be caused by campaign contributions to judi-
cial elections.197 Although public financing of campaigns is
strictly voluntary, it has seen many success stories.198
Despite the fact that many favor public financing, there are
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cases challenging it on First Amendment grounds.199 In a
notable example, the United States Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari over a First Amendment challenge to
Arizona’s public financing statute in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.200 In the meantime, how-
ever, Citizens United may pave the way for unbridled corporate
contributions to judicial campaigns in states where there are
no limits on corporate contributions to elections. But all of the
concerns over campaign contributions to judicial campaigns
may take a backseat if judges consistently perform well. As
Judge Kevin Burke put it “the best anecdote or vaccine to all of
the problems with the methods is consistently good perfor-
mance by the courts. If there is public satisfaction with the 100
million cases heard each year, even Bill Gates won’t be able to
buy a judge.”201
B. Oversight Commissions
There has been a continuing call for the creation of judicial
oversight commissions.202 The oversight performed by such
commissions ranges from judicial education programs to an
examination of judicial codes. For example, in 2006, the
Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee was
formed, an unofficial, non-partisan organization. The
Committee’s objectives include educating the public “about
the important differences between judicial campaigns and
campaigns for partisan political office,” helping candidates
“campaign in an ethical and dignified manner,” monitoring
advertising “to detect and deter improper campaigning,” and
investigating complaints “about unfair campaign tactics and
[issuing] public statements about such tactics.”203 The com-
mittee also asks judicial candidates to sign a campaign pledge,
which states that the candidate will conduct their campaigns
in accordance with the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct.204
The pledge further states that candidates will not engage in
false or misleading advertising and will not make accusations
that “impugn the integrity of the judicial system, the integrity
of a candidate, or erode public trust and confidence in the
independence and impartiality
of the judiciary.”205 The
National Center for State
Courts recently added an
Internet resource to aid those
states that are contemplating
the establishment of an over-
sight committee.206 The ABA
House of Delegates has also
recommended campaign con-
duct committees.207
C. Mandatory
Qualifications
While the merit method has
minimum qualifications in
place for judicial appointments by nomination commissions,
elective states sometimes have little or no minimum qualifica-
tions for a judicial candidate.208 This might result in a new
attorney without any legal experience running against an
incumbent judge. Those states that have election methods
should consider creating or strengthening judicial qualifica-
tions. Another approach is to establish statewide systems of
independent judicial qualification commissions who will be
charged with identifying and encouraging potential candidates
to run for judicial office. These commissions would evaluate
the candidates to ensure that whoever is on the ballot is indeed
qualified.209
D. Better Voter Education and Awareness
There are some scholars who believe that the most impor-
tant agent for change lies in educating the public about the
work of judges.210 To this end judges can increase their inter-
action with citizens and educate them about the judicial
branch and the duties and obligations of a judge. But these out-
reach efforts need not be limited to judges. For example, “in
Arizona and Missouri new 501(C)(3) organizations will work
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district commissions”). 
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regarding elected judges in at least three states. See Schotland,
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220. For a collection of sources regarding the affect of judicial selec-
tion on sentencing practices, tort awards, frequency of litigation,
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(1985) (determining that findings indicate that appointment and
merit-selection systems increase minority judicial representation
to a greater extent than elective systems); see also Kevin M.
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SELECTION 7 (Am. Judicature Soc’y ed. 1999). But see Webster,
supra note 153, at 33 (“Some conclude that the method of selec-
tion has little effect upon the number of women and minorities
reaching the bench. Others conclude that, while contested elec-
tions result in fewer women and minorities reaching the bench
than do other systems, women and minorities generally fare bet-
ter under appointive systems than under ‘merit’ systems. Still
others insist that ‘merit’ systems bring the greatest number of
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222. E.g., Dubois, supra note 133.
directly on public education
about courts and law.”211
Similarly, voter guides are
utilized in both retention
campaigns and election cam-
paigns.212 More states and
local governments should
consider these voter-educa-
tion efforts.
E. Extended Term Lengths
There are many benefits to
lengthier judicial terms of
office no matter what the
selection and retention method. For the election method, a
lengthier term means less campaigning and fundraising and
therefore less pitfalls for judicial conduct violations.213 It also
allows the judge to focus on the bench matters as opposed to
election matters.214 In all systems, a lengthier term would
make the position more appealing to potential judicial candi-
dates and support more judicial independence.215
F. Randomly Selected Citizen Commissions,
Independent Paid Evaluators, Threshold Responses,
Weighted Measurements, and Appeals Processes 
The judicial-election method is not alone in needing some
stopgap measures. There are inherent concerns with the merit-
selection method:  the risk that appointments to nominating
commissions may be politicized, the attorney-centric composi-
tion of these commissions, and the potentially flawed method-
ology these commissions use to compile data on judges. To
avoid the concern that politics and the bar influence commis-
sions too greatly, states could form commissions in part by ran-
domly selecting citizens from the rolls of registered voters from
each congressional district. The remaining commission seats
could be filled out with political appointments from categories
such as higher education, labor, and of course, the law. This is
the process used by the Washington Citizens’ Commission on
Salaries for Elected Officials, which oversees judges’ salaries.216
To address the data-compilation problem, a state might follow
the lead of Alaska, which has a court-watcher program to eval-
uate judges.217 Regarding concerns over the potential for sta-
tistically insignificant data and skewed results, states could
require a threshold number of responses in each category of
respondents or use a weighted measurement of those
responses. States should also establish a simple appeals process
for judges who believe that a negative evaluation violated their
due process rights, as opposed to requiring a judge to appeal to
a higher-level commission or resort to litigation.218
VI. WHAT MAKES A GOOD JUDGE
The presupposition of the debate is that everyone, including
the judges themselves, want a judge to be a “good” judge, and
each method claims to produce the best judges. Measuring
judicial quality has been researched and addressed by many.
Which method produces the greatest judicial quality has been
examined through the lenses of judicial discipline,219 sentenc-
ing practices, tort awards, frequency of litigation, frequency of
discrimination suits,220 number of women and minority
judges,221 and independence versus accountability.222 The
question might also be tackled by asking what individual char-
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223. A copy of the guidelines can be viewed on the Nebraska Judicial
Branch’s website. Nebraska Judicial  Branch, American Bar
Association’s Guidelines for Reviewing Qualifications of
Candidates for State Judicial Office, http://supreme
court.ne.gov/commissions/aba-manual.shtml (last visited Dec. 9,
2010).
224. JOHN ADAMS, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present
State of the American Colonies (1763), reprinted in THE
REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS ch. 9 (Liberty Fund
2000).
225. Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial
“Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 803 n.3 (2004).
acteristics or qualities are desirable in a judge. In 1984, the
ABA set forth the favored personal characteristics for a judge as
integrity, legal knowledge and ability, professional experience,
judicial temperament, diligence, health, financial responsibil-
ity, and public service.223 John Adams, in Thoughts on
Government, stated that judges “should be always men of learn-
ing and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great
patience, calmness, coolness, and attention. Their minds
should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not
be dependent upon any man, or body of men.”224 Given this
quote, it seems the merit-selection method may have an edge
because it is easier for nominating commissions to ensure the
presence of these qualifications, while at the same time judges
will not be dependent on a “body of men.” But one should bear
in mind that either method of selection—merit or election—
has the potential to produce good judges. If the electorate is
educated and the qualifications to run for office are high, the
judge that is selected through the election method may also
possess these desired traits. On the other hand, one must also
remember that these desired qualities and characteristics are
dynamic, not static—a judge selected through the merit
method may ultimately become a “bad” judge. And even if the
backgrounds and characteristics of judges are carefully scruti-
nized under both methods, a “stellar resume does not neces-
sarily indicate an excellent analytical mind or first-class judi-
cial craftsmanship.”225
VII. CONCLUSION 
The various methods currently used for selecting judges
have their roots in U.S. history. What began as the lifetime
appointments method morphed into the three methods that
can be seen in action in the states today:  appointment, elec-
tion, and merit selection. Movements involving politicians,
organizations, and the electorate precipitated the development
and popularity of each method. These methods have become
more complex over time, with the states either modifying them
or toggling between them. This complexity is now com-
pounded by the Supreme Court’s decisions in White, Citizens
United, and Caperton, which have all advanced issues related to
judicial elections and campaigns, including free speech and
campaign finance. These three cases impact almost all judges,
regardless of how they are selected. Merit-selected judges may
face the prospect of campaigning during retention elections,
and thus, like their elected counterparts, may be affected by
the ruling in Citizens United. It is only the lifetime appointed
judges that need not concern themselves with the implication
of that case. 
But even though merit-selected and appointed judges may
be able to elude the potential pitfalls of judicial campaigns,
they must remain cognizant of the propriety of commenting on
controversial issues that may come before the court—such
comments now seem constitu-
tionally sanctioned after the
Supreme Court’s decision in
White. Although a judge up for
retention may not be as obliged
to comment or announce their
views as often as their elected
colleagues who are conducting
a campaign, they may still
make statements on controver-
sial issues that will be impacted
by White. While the White case
opens the door to judicial
speech on controversial mat-
ters, the adoption and imple-
mentation of the 2007 ABA
Code will hopefully clarify
where the outer bounds of
White’s implications lie.
Because Caperton intimated
that judges might have to recuse themselves for perceived
favoritism or partiality, this case may also impact both merit-
selected and appointed judges.  Despite the free speech protec-
tions  in White, these judges might still face recusal or disqual-
ification under Caperton if they comment or announce their
views on a matter that later appears before them. Additionally,
considering Caperton alongside Citizens United and the result-
ing clamor over funds being raised in judicial elections, judges
need to be aware of who is contributing to their campaigns and
the amount of funds given, and whether those two factors may
create a perceived or actual bias with respect to any parties
appearing before them. Collectively, these recent Supreme
Court cases affecting the judiciary still leave much to be
resolved.
These three cases, along with the ever-increasing funds
raised in judicial campaigns and the continued dissatisfaction
with the judiciary as a whole, have reignited the two-century
old debate about which method of judicial selection is the best.
Asking what method is “best” begs the question of what
method produces the “best” judges. The answer depends upon
which lens you are looking through. But even then, one must
remember that a judge’s behavior and conduct may be
dynamic, not static.
From the inauguration of the U.S., there have been many
arguments for and against the varying methods of selecting
judges. Although the election method may appear to be in dire
straits, no one method is free from controversy, no one method
is perfect, and there is no silver bullet for attaining perfection.
What history tells us is that what a particular method claims to
accomplish and what the evidence suggests that it accom-
plishes are sometimes different. More importantly, history tells
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226. In 2000, the National Center for State Courts organized the
National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection under the
leadership of Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas R.
Phillips and Texas Senator Rodney Ellis. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON
IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION (2001), http://www.ncsc
online.org/wc/publications/Res_JudSel_CallToActionPub.pdf.
The Call to Action included twenty recommendations, which for
the most part have gone unanswered with the exception of a fol-
low-up Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment, which urged bar associations to take the lead in
forming judicial campaign conduct committees. See NAT’L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, SYMPOSIUM ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2002), http://www.ncsc
online.org/WC/Publications/Res_JudSel_JudCampCondEvt
Pub.pdf. In 2005, “a conference of 38 states’ chief justices, jus-
tices, judges, and others,” sent to the Conference of Chief
Justices a call to action that stated, “In the end each State must
make its own decisions on what is a suitable selection system.”
Schotland, supra note 135, at 1090. In 2006, the New York State
Judicial Institute held the Symposium on Enhancing Voter
Participation on Judicial Elections. Joy Beane, Judicial Institute
Hosts Voter Education Symposium, BENCHMARKS, Summer 2006, at
8, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/
benchmarks/issue4/votereducation.shtml. In 2007, California’s
Judicial Council formed the Commission for Impartial Courts,
including the Task Force on Judicial Selection and Retention,
which is designed to evaluate “any proposals to improve the
methods and procedures of selecting and retaining judges.”
California Courts, Commission for Impartial Courts,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/tflists/commimpart_about.htm.
In 2009, Northwestern University School of Law hosted a panel
of judges and professors to debate and discuss the issue of how
to select judges, 
us that the debate may go on forever without any true resolu-
tion. While this Paper did not attempt to construct a hypo-
thetical, perfect method, it did present some interim remedies.
In the context of judicial elections, these measures include
campaign finance reform, public financing of judicial cam-
paigns, oversight commissions, mandatory qualifications,
extended term lengths, and improved voter education and
awareness. In the context of the merit method, these measures
include randomly selected citizen nominating commissions,
independent court evaluators, and improved court evaluation
data through threshold responses, weighted measurements,
and an appeals process for negative evaluations.
Although judges’ behavior and actions may be unfairly
influenced by the judicial selection method used in their state,
there are several means for keeping this undesirable conse-
quence in check, including case law, advisory opinions, and
judicial codes of conduct. But these factors should only serve
as a baseline for what is acceptable conduct for a judge—it is
not enough for judges to merely seek technical compliance
with the fluctuating methods of selection and retention or the
mechanics of judicial directives and mandates. Judges should
take a leadership role and become visionaries. In this role,
judges may encourage those individuals and organizations
engaging in the judicial-selection debate to consider using
their energy, talent, and capital to collaborate across the ideo-
logical divides and explore a selection method that both accen-
tuates the positive and eliminates the negative aspects of the
existing methods. This exploration must include sensitivity to
the inculcated cultural and socio-political differences between
all judges and all methods. It is not enough to substitute one
method for another. To do so would be akin to replacing an
engine in a car that has electrical problems in the hope that it
would run more efficiently.
Building upon the extensive literature, the dearth of studies,
and the numerous prior national and statewide summits and
symposia on the subject matter,226 judges could harness and
capitalize on the new fervor in the debate and seek to reframe
it. To this end, the American Judges Association could build
upon its previous White Paper on fairness, and continue to
enhance the credibility of judges, by proposing and hosting a
think tank, summit, or symposium on this subject. This
approach should not only include judges, scholars, organiza-
tions, and lawmakers, as was done in the past to some degree,
but should also include a missing component:  the socio-cul-
tural experts. This addition could address the difficulty with
paradigm shifts, cultural change, and change management.
This approach will forge relationships, advance the discus-
sions, and hopefully create a new blueprint for judicial selec-
tion. We as judges need to look outside ourselves, think out-
side the box, shift the paradigm, and consider creating a selec-
tion method that recognizes and reinforces the true objective
of selecting and retaining judges, that is, impartiality, indepen-
dence, and accountability. The citizenry needs to trust that
when judges are given a choice between impartiality and bias,
honesty and dishonesty, and reason and capriciousness, judges
will invariably choose the more honorable of these concepts.
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HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS BY STATE*
STATE START/END 
METHOD (YEARS)
# OF PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS
(e.g. Creation of Commissions, Terms,
Retirement Age) (YEARS)
VEHICLES FOR 
CHANGE
# OF FAILED
ATTEMPTS TO 
MODIFY 
ALABAMA 1819-Election
1867- Election
(5) 1819, 1830, 1850, 1867, 2009 None 4
ALASKA 1959-Merit
1980-Merit
(4) 1959, 1968, 1975, 1980 None 3
ARIZONA 1912-Election
1974-Merit
(5) 1912, 1960, 1965, 1974, 1992 Ballot Initiative 2
ARKANSAS 1836-Election
2001-Election-nonpartisan
(8)1836, 1848, 1864, 1868, 1874, 1978, 2000, 2001 Legislative Act,
Constitutional Amendment
4
CALIFORNIA 1849-Election
1998-Election
(11) 1849, 1862, 1879, 1904, 1911, 1926, 1934,
1960, 1979, 1986, 1998
Legislative Act, Ballot Initiative ?
COLORADO 1876-Election
1966-Merit
(10) 1976, 1891, 1902, 1904, 1913, 1966, 1970,
1982, 1988, 2008
Constitutional Amendment 2
CONNECTICUT 1784-Election
1818-Appointment
(8) 1784, 1818, 1856, 1876, 1880, 1965, 1982, 1986 Legislative Act,
Constitutional Amendment
0 Since 
2000
DELAWARE 1776-Appointment
1897-Appointment
(6) 1776, 1792, 1831, 1897, 1951, 1977 None 0 Since 
2000
DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA
1970-Appointment
1986-Appointment
(5) 1970, 1973, 1977, 1984, 1986 None 1
FLORIDA 1845-Election
2001-Election
(15) 1845, 1848, 1851, 1853, 1861, 1868, 1875,
1885, 1942, 1957, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1998, 2001
Legislative Act, Executive Order,
Constitutional Amendment
4
GEORGIA 1777-Appointment
1983-Elections-nonpartisan
(15) 1777, 1789, 1798, 1812, 1835, 1845, 1865,
1868, 1877, 1896, 1898, 1906, 1972, 1983, 2000
Legislative Act,
Constitutional Amendment
0 Since 
2000
HAWAII 1959-Appointment
1978-Appointment
(3) 1959, 1968, 1978 None 2
IDAHO 1890-Election
1934-Election nonpartisan
(6) 1890, 1934, 1967, 1980, 1982, 2003 Constitutional Amendment 5
ILLINOIS 1818-Election
1964-Election partisan
(6) 1818, 1848, 1870, 1964, 1992, 2009 Constitutional Amendment 4
INDIANA 1816-Appointment
1970-Appointment + 
Elections partisan
(7) 1816, 1851, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1970, 1986 Constitutional Amendment 2
IOWA 1846-Election
1962-Merit
(9) 1846, 1857, 1868, 1876, 1915, 1962, 1973, 1976,
2007
Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
KANSAS 1861-Election
1958-Merit
(6) 1861, 1895, 1958, 1972, 1977, 2006 Constitutional Amendment 3
KENTUCKY 1792-Appointment
1975-Election nonpartisan
(3) 1792, 1850, 1975 Constitutional Amendment 1
LOUISIANA 1812-Appointment
1904-Election
(12) 1812, 1845, 1852, 1864, 1868, 1879, 1904,
1906, 1921, 1974, 2000, 2006
Constitutional Amendment 10
MAINE 1819-Appointment
1839-Appointment
(2) 1819, 1839 None 0 Since 
2000
MARYLAND 1776-Appointment
1851-Election
(9) 1776,1837,1851, 1864, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1971,
1976
Legislative Act 0 Since 
2000
MASSACHUSETTS 1780-Appointment
1972-Appointment
(2) 1780, 1972 None 0 Since 
2000
MICHIGAN 1836-Appointment
1850-Election
(7) 1836, 1850, 1908, 1939, 1963, 1968, 1996 Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
MINNESOTA 1857-Election
1912-Election nonpartisan
(5) 1857, 1883, 1912, 1983, 1989 Legislative Act 2
MISSISSIPPI 1817-Appointment
2008-Elections nonpartisan
(11) 1817, 1832, 1868, 1890, 1910, 1914, 1993,
1994, 1999, 2002, 2008
Constitutional Amendment 1
MISSOURI 1820-Appointment
1940-Nonpartisan Selection
(13) 1820, 1849, 1872, 1875, 1884, 1909, 1940,
1942, 1945, 1970, 1973, 1976, 2008
Constitutional Amendment 5
MONTANA 1889-Election
1935-Election nonpartisan
(6) 1889, 1909, 1911, 1935, 1972, 1973 Constitutional Amendment 1
NEBRASKA 1866-Election
1962-Merit
(7) 1866, 1875, 1909, 1920, 1962, 1974, 1990 Constitutional Amendment 1
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NEVADA 1864-Election
1976-Election
(3) 1864, 1976, 1972 None 7
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1784-Appointment
2005-Appointment
(5) 1784, 1792, 2000, 2001, 2005 None 3
NEW JERSEY 1776-Appointment
1994-Appointment
(5) 1776, 1844, 1902, 1947, 1994 None 1
NEW MEXICO 1912-Election
1988-Appointment + 
Election partisan (hybrid system)
(5) 1912, 1952, 1965, 1988, 1994 Constitutional Amendment 1
NEW YORK 1777-Appointment
1977-Merit
(9) 1777, 1822, 1847, 1876, 1895, 1913, 1961,
1975, 1977
Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
NORTH CAROLINA 1776-Appointment
2002-Election nonpartisan
(7) 1776, 1868, 1967, 1977, 1996, 2001, 2002 Executive Order
Legislative Act
6
NORTH DAKOTA 1889-Election
1909-Election nonpartisan
(7) 1889, 1909, 1930, 1967, 1976, 1987, 1998 Legislative Act 0 Since 
2000
OHIO 1802-Election
1912-Election
(7) 1802, 1851, 1883, 1892, 1912, 1913, 1968 None 1
OKLAHOMA 1907-Election
1987-Merit
(5) 1907, 1909, 1967, 1968, 1987 Constitutional Amendment 2
OREGON 1859-Election
1931-Election nonpartisan
(7) 1859, 1878, 1910, 1931, 1961, 1969, 1976 Legislative Act 4
PENNSYLVANIA 1776-Appointment
1968-Election partisan
(10) 1776, 1790, 1838, 1850, 1874, 1895, 1913,
1921, 1964, 1968
Constitutional Amendment 7
RHODE ISLAND 1842-Election
1994-Merit + Appointment
(7) 1842, 1902, 1905, 1932, 1956, 1994, 2007 Legislative Act
Constitutional Amendment
0 Since 
2000
SOUTH CAROLINA 1776-Election
1996-Merit  w/Election
(12) 1776, 1778, 1790, 1865, 1868, 1895, 1911,
1976, 1979, 1984, 1990, 1996
Constitutional Amendment 4
SOUTH DAKOTA 1889-Election
1980-Merit
(4) 1889, 1921, 1972, 1980 Legislative Act
Constitutional  Amendment
1
TENNESSEE 1796-Election
1971-Merit
(8) 1796, 1835, 1853, 1971, 1974, 1994, 2001,
2009
Legislative Act 2
TEXAS 1845-Appointment
1891-Election
(6) 1845, 1866, 1869, 1876, 1891, 1965 Constitutional Amendment 12
UTAH 1896-Election
1985-Merit
(8) 1896, 1945, 1951, 1967, 1985, 1987, 1994,
2007
Ballot Initiative 0 Since 
2000
VERMONT 1777-Appointment
1974-Merit
(6) 1777, 1786, 1850, 1870, 1967, 1974 Ballot Initiative 0 Since 
2000
VIRGINIA 1776-Election
1870-Election by General Assembly
(8) 1776, 1850, 1864, 1870, 1970, 1983, 2002,
2008
Constitutional Amendment 1
WASHINGTON 1889-Election
1969-Election nonpartisan
(5) 1889, 1907, 1969, 1995, 2006 Constitutional Amendment 2
WEST VIRGINIA 1862-Election
2010-Election
(6) 1862, 1872, 1974, 2000, 2010, 2010 None 0 Since 
2000
WISCONSIN 1848-Election
1977-Election
(8) 1848, 1853, 1889, 1977, 1983, 1987, 2001,
2009
Constitutional Amendment
Executive Order
0 Since 
2000
WYOMING 1890-Elected
1972-Merit
(5 ) 1890, 1972, 1976, 1977, 2000 Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
* This appendix was compiled from information found on the American Judicature Society website, http://www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2010).
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